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Fears that Hong Kong’s liberal press system would becompromised under Chinese rule have proved unfounded:
newspapers and magazines, as well as certain television and radio
current affairs programmes, continue to be outspoken and often
highly critical of the local government. However, the grounds for
concern about loss of this freedom remain, and in some ways are
more worrying five years after the handover than before as the
Hong Kong government deals with the strain of maintaining a
balance between local forces and Beijing while facing economic
decline since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. This paper
examines the changes in Hong Kong that have affected the news
media in the five years since the handover to discern the conditions
that underpin the current freedoms and affect future development.
Background
Before the handover to China in 1997 Hong Kong’s news
media covered a spectrum from mainland communist to Taiwan
nationalist – ultra-leftist, leftist, centrist and rightist (Lee & Chan,
1990) – but the extremes had few customers and the mainstream
local news was apolitical, apathetic and skilfully managed by the
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This paper examines the current situation of Hong Kong’s news media
in the context of the development of Hong Kong’s government and its
relations with Beijing. Despite expectations that press freedom would
be eroded under Chinese rule the news media remain very free and
outspoken, especially in criticising the local administration. However,
much of the ownership of the news media is already in pro-Beijing hands,
and, with democracy declining and the role of the legislature and the
opposition being eroded, concerns arise that restrictive laws already in
existence as well as those due to be made may be used later to reduce the
freedom of the press.
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colonial government (Lee & Chu, 1995). From the mid-1980s, spurred
by the 1984 signing of the Joint Declaration arranging the colony’s
handover from Britain to China, the news media became more active
and opinionated, turning into what Paul Lee and Leonard Chu call
a Type II system, that is, relatively free (Lee & Chu, 1995).
In the 1990s up to 1997, when the last British governor, Chris
Patten, instituted much broader elections to the Legislative Council
(Legco), government-media relations developed into what Lee and
Chu call a “reformist” model, identified by three characteristics: the
media serve as a watchdog of government but are not hostile to it,
the government makes no effort at suppression, and people support
the media (Chu & Lee, 1995). A defining point of the new atmosphere
was the appearance in 1995 of Apple Daily, whose founder, Jimmy
Lai Chi-ying, was a strong critic of Beijing. The new paper broadened
debate and boosted the sector by provoking a price war, pushing
the mass circulation market into increasingly sensational coverage
of crimes, scandals, accidents, suicides and the like. Television kept
its staid news bulletins but instituted ‘infotainment’ programmes
about sensational matters.
Despite the revitalisation of the news arena and the guarantee
of press freedom in Article 27 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s
constitution, many were concerned before 1997 that Chinese
government influence would restrict the press. Lee and Chu
predicted that the Hong Kong media would move to Type III, that
is, relatively repressive (Lee & Chu, 1995) and would after 1997
“legitimate the new master without feeling great discomfort”, a trend
that had started well before the handover (Lee & Chu, 1998). A
colleague and I have pointed out that there are still some little-used
repressive laws from the colonial administration despite attempts
to update them with regard to human rights. These include the
Emergency Regulations Ordinance, which allows for censorship
under emergency conditions, and the Police Force Ordinance, under
which police can obtain warrants to search the premises of news
organisations, as well as the Public Order Ordinance (POO), whose
controls on public meetings and rallies have been tightened up by
the new administration (see below) (Clarke & Hamlett, 1995; Hamlett
& Clarke, 1997).
Some commentators emphasised the grounds for optimism. Lo
Shiu-hing argued that Beijing had an instrumental view of Hong
Kong as a means to attract Taiwan back into the fold, and therefore
would be likely not to stray from the Basic Law (Lo, 1998), while
Frank Ching suggested that the Chinese government would respect
Hong Kong’s freedoms because the territory was an important
showcase in its desire to achieve Western standards (Ching, 1999).
Moreover, as Scollon (1997) noted, what was distinctive about local
newspapers was “the variety of styles, points of view, and, indeed,
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of separate publications and publishing companies”, so that, unlike
news media in the West, they had not been subsumed into huge
corporations and “represent one of the world’s most diversified
theatres of public discourse.” This has meant that the Internet,
widely accessible in homes in the territory, has become more a
tool for reading the local press than an outlet for criticism of the
government.
Thus the news media system has remained ‘Type II’. Although
the range of opinion narrowed with the collapse of the Taiwan-
sponsored press just before the handover and the movement of a
number of news organisations to a pro-mainland stance, the news
media still cover a broad area. The mainland-run press continues
and is important in articulating Beijing’s views, though its audience
is still small, and, while the mass-circulation newspapers remain
generally ‘populist-centrist’ without strong political opinions, local
issues are hotly discussed and newspapers take different stands
(Lee & Chu, 1998; Pan, 2002). Reporters Sans Frontières, the French
non-governmental organisation that tracks press freedom around
the world, recently placed Hong Kong at number 18 out of 139
countries and territories examined, the highest score in Asia
(though Taiwan was not included) and one rank below the United
States (US) and three ranks above Britain.  Complaints about
commercialisation and sensationalism abound, but these
phenomena can themselves be seen as one result of a high level of
press freedom in a free market economy.
Over the five years since the handover, however, Hong Kong
itself has changed. Some democratic reforms initiated by Chris
Patten, such as the POO, have been rolled back, and opposition
voices increasingly sidelined. The local economy, facing recession,
has become more and more integrated with and dependent on
the mainland’s. The news media may appear to be beyond
government control but in fact are already largely in the hands of
pro-government and pro-China interests. This paper argues that
there is strong potential for danger to the freedoms enjoyed by
the news media in Hong Kong.
The Basic Law prescribed an executive-led government and
provided regulations for the election of the Chief Executive (CE)
and the Legislative Council, but since the handover the leeway in
interpretation has been exercised to increase the power of the
executive at the expense of the legislative level.
After Patten’s reforms produced a Legco that “was regarded
as the most democratically elected legislature in Hong Kong’s
history” in 1995 (Chen, 2001), an appointed provisional Legco took
over for a year from the 1 July 1997 handover, and for the 1998
Changes In
Government
Since The
Handover
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and 2000 elections changes were made to electoral rules that
favoured the pro-government and pro-Beijing groups rather than
the pro-democracy parties that had become so popular under Patten
(Newman & Rabushka, 1998; Chen, 2001). The latter groups now
command fewer than 20 of the 60 seats, so that government
legislation goes through easily. This has given rise to criticisms of
the hasty passage of bills that have wide implications for all kinds
of freedom. One was the United Nations (UN) (Anti-Terrorism
Measures) Bill 2002, drafted in response to the UN’s call for such
legislation after the United States plane bombings of 11 September
2001. The legislation was passed in July 2002 amid complaints from
pro-democracy Legco members that some provisions could trap
innocent people (Leung & Li, 2002) and from the Hong Kong Bar
Association that there were already laws that dealt with terrorism
and that the bill had been hurried through when there was no
urgency (Hong Kong Bar Association, 2002).  There were criticisms
of too much haste also in the passing of a bill setting up the
“ministerial” system in June 2002 (see below) (Cheung et al., 2002)
and another to cut civil servants’ pay in July (Yeung, 2002). The
composition of Legco and the methods of election can be changed
after 2007, according to the Basic Law, but any new procedures
will require a two-thirds majority in the body itself and the consent
of the CE (Annex II: II III), so that in current circumstances any
move towards democratisation is hardly likely to succeed.
In 2002 Tung Chee-hwa, selected as CE before the handover,
came up for re-election to a second five-year term. Well before the
due date he had gathered 700 supporters among the 800-strong
selection committee, making it clear that no one could stand against
him, despite independent polls showing his popularity to be
declining. He was allowed HK$9.5 million for election expenses
even though he proved to be the sole candidate. His first act in his
new term in July was to revamp the executive level of government
with what was termed an “accountability” system. The existing
formulation, inherited from the colonial era, had an Executive
Council appointed by the CE to advise him, while civil servants
were appointed as secretaries of the government departments. This
structure was replaced by a single layer of highly-paid “ministers”
appointed by the CE and who could resign or be sacked (though in
what circumstances was not made clear).
Answering criticisms of the system, officials have pointed to
ministerial systems in other countries without noting the role there
of democratic election and legislative scrutiny. Some continuing
appointees, such as Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung Oi-sie, had
been unpopular in the earlier administration. The system was tested
soon after it began when in July the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
issued a consultation paper suggesting the de-listing of “penny
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stocks”, causing a massive market dive the next day.
An inquiry panel found that government officials and market
regulators were not to blame, but there was so much public
antipathy that eventually the new Secretary for Financial Services,
Frederick Ma Si-hang, made a public apology and his ultimate
boss, Financial Secretary Antony Leung Kam-chung, admitted that
he himself “could have done better” (J. Cheung, 2002). Then in
October the new Secretary for Education, Prof Arthur Li Kwok-
cheung, announced that two universities, one of which he had
headed in his previous job, would merge, when neither had been
fully consulted on the matter. Many academics and others in fact
deplored the plan. The “ministers”  involved in these controversies
remain in place.
The new methods of election and selection at the legislative
and executive levels have served to entrench supporters of Tung
as well as to nurture relations between Hong Kong’s ruling élite
and the Chinese government. Fu Hualing (2001: 77) finds that
Beijing has substantial influence over the CE, other officials and
law makers, as well as local business, and says, “The unholy
alliance between Beijing’s top Communists and Hong Kong’s
richest capitalists provides the most effective channel for Beijing
to influence Hong Kong’s political and legal development.” In a
way this situation provides a safeguard for stability because it
ensures that anti-Beijing activity, while not stifled, can do no more
than provide informational input to policy decisions, yet on the
other hand the lack of effective outlets for dissenting views may
force opposition groups to seek non-formal and less orderly means
of expression.
While it must be acknowledged that the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (SAR) government has had a difficult task
in implementing one-country-two-systems in a time of recession,
the administration has not distinguished itself in dealing with
crises. Its reactions have been characterised by ad hoc measures,
occasional backtracking on policy announcements, and overtly
favouring the business sector, which also supports Beijing. Some
of these cases will be briefly examined.
•  Right of abode: Some mainlanders sought right of abode
under Article 24 of the Basic Law based on the residency of their
parents, though these parents had not been Hong Kong residents
at the time of the claimants’ birth. When the applications were
rejected, the claimants took their case to the courts and won in
the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) in 1999. The government then
obtained an ‘interpretation’ of Article 24 from the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress that overturned the
Controversial
Acts Of The
Government
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CFA decision. The ruling prompted demonstrations and widespread
concern because the Basic Law recognised the CFA as having “the
power of final adjudication” in Hong Kong (Article 82). The right-
of-abode claimants have continued to press their case through the
courts as well as demonstrations, but most have been returned to
the mainland, some after raids on their homes.
•  Public order: Under the Patten administration the POO was
liberalised, replacing the requirement that public gatherings get
police permits with simple notification, but amendments passed in
1997 added the need for a police certificate of no objection a week
in advance if there were to be 50 or more at a meeting or more than
29 at a demonstration.  In August 2000 sixteen students were arrested
after a rally in support of the right-of-abode seekers; seven were
charged under the POO, and five of them were also later charged
under the POO for an earlier demonstration. The charges were
dropped amid public sympathy for the students (HKJA, 2001; HKJA
& Article 19, 2001). In November 2002 three political activists were
found guilty under the POO of an unauthorised rally earlier in the
year, though the magistrate questioned the bringing of the case to
court in the first place because of its possible political nature. Yet
demonstrations by government supporters were dealt with more
leniently.
In mid-2002 rallies by New Territories villagers, whose Heung
Yee Kuk organisation is a staunch government supporter, and by
famous figures in the film industry, neither of which had permits,
did not attract police action. In another case, a charge of flag
desecration was upheld by the CFA in 1999 despite an earlier appeal
ruling that the laws used to prosecute were incompatible with the
Basic Law, and two further prosecutions followed in 2002. Falun
Gong members and US activist Harry Wu, who has investigated
prison conditions in China, have been denied entry to Hong Kong
in what seems like a nod to Beijing’s sensitivities.
•  Manipulation of popularity polls: In July 2000 Robert
Chung Ting-yiu of the University of Hong Kong (HKU) alleged in
an article in the South China Morning Post that Tung Chee-hwa’s
special assistant had placed pressure on him via the university’s
vice-chancellor and pro-vice-chancellor to end public opinion polls
on the CE’s popularity. A televised inquiry, set up by HKU, found
the charge basically substantiated, calling the CE’s aide a “poor and
untruthful witness”. The two university officials resigned, but the
CE’s special assistant remained in place (HKJA, 2001: 4; HKJA &
Article 19, 2001: 16).
• Favouritism: There have been several instances where the
administration has appeared to act to help its supporters. In 1998
three employees of the Hong Kong Standard were found guilty of
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inflating circulation figures to advertisers, but the company’s then
owner, Sally Aw Sian, a supporter of the government and friend
of Beijing since the early 1990s, was not prosecuted despite being
named at first as one of the conspirators. In 1999, the government
handed the last major vacant site on Hong Kong island without
tender to PCCW, the local telephone company, which is headed
by Richard Li Tzar-kai. Li is a son of Hong Kong’s richest tycoon
Li Ka-Shing, who is close to both the Hong Kong and Beijing
regimes. PCCW remains the staple telecommunications company,
despite moves to deregulate the market, and is the territory’s main
Internet and broadband service provider (though one of its main
competitors is Hutchison, which is headed by the elder Li). The
quiet reversal of the CE’s initial policy to build 85,000 new flats a
year and later measures to end government-built low-cost home
ownership blocks and reduce the amount of land released for
development have been seen as helping the big property
companies weather the fall in house prices.
Ironically, the government’s blunders are widely known
because of the freedom of the news media. Indeed, there is little
holding back on criticism of the CE and his administration. Yet
the actions of the government mentioned above indicate that
efforts are being made to establish controls for the future, and
there are specific areas of the news where danger to press freedom
lies.
Journalists and the law
Several cases were handled in ways that drew criticism. In
1997 the mass-market Oriental Daily News (ODN) sent its paparazzi
to harass a judge who had ruled against its parent company in a
copyright complaint against Apple Daily for stealing a picture of a
local star. Wong Yeung-ng, former editor of ODN, was sentenced
to four months’ jail in mid-1998 for contempt on the grounds of
scandalising the court, a charge rarely used in modern times. Anne
Cheung criticises the use of this charge because it is vague and
fails to separate press freedom from physical harassment (A.
Cheung, 2002: 207-209), while Tim Hamlett calls the offence “a
serious hazard for the media in Asia-Pacific countries with a
Common Law background” because judges decide on cases in
which they themselves are involved (Hamlett, 2001). In another
case the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
raided Apple Daily in 2000 in search of evidence against a reporter
said to have bribed the police for information (he was later found
guilty of this charge), and Apple Daily brought a case against the
ICAC on the grounds that the search warrant was not valid. The
The News
Media
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initial effort failed and the case was taken to appeal but disallowed
at CFA level (HKJA & Article 19, 2000: 11-12). Anne Cheung takes
the judiciary to task for not being more forceful in establishing the
primacy of the Basic Law’s guarantee of press freedom, finding that
judges instead concentrate on points of Common Law because
“deference to authority is valued higher than the respect of civil
liberties” (A. Cheung, 2002: 192).
A  main worry has been the government’s proposal to
implement Article 23 of the Basic Law, which requires the Hong
Kong SAR to enact laws on treason, secession, sedition, subversion
against the Central People’s Government and theft of state secrets,
as well as to stop foreign political groups conducting political
activities in Hong Kong or establishing ties with local political
groups. No time frame was set and many had hoped that it would
be delayed indefinitely, Cullen (2001) and Fu (2001) among others
believing that there is no need for further legislation because the
area is well covered already. The HKJA & Article 19 (2002: 2)
requested the government not to take action at all or at least to
guarantee that any legislation passed would come up to
international human rights standards.
In February 2003 the draft legislaton was published and passed
to Legco. Reassuringly,  it addressed many of the major complaints.
However, concerns remained. The Hong Kong Journalists
Association noted that although the offence of “unauthorised
access” to official information had been limited to that gained by
criminal means, it was still a threat to journalists, who may not
know that information they receive has been obtained in such a
way as, for example, in the case of a letter posted to a newspaper.
Moreover, the publication of information gained through criminal
means may in fact be in the public interest, and this is not allowed
as a defence; nor even is prior publication. The HKJA called also
for the dropping of the offence of dealing with seditious
publications, even though this has been clarified in the final version
of the law. Other complaints include the empowering of the
Secretary for Security to ban groups on national security grounds,
including cases of local organisations subordinate to groups banned
on the mainland on such grounds (Bale, 2003).
For the news media the proposals have a number of concerns.
One is over the proposal for legislation on sedition. This revives a
moribund law, last used in 1952, and gives no special protection to
reporting. Official secrets legislation is also taken further than what
exists, criminalising unauthorised access to protected information
– a threat to any journalist who receives such information
anonymously – with such areas to include relations between Hong
Kong and the Chinese government, a clearly newsworthy subject.
Misprision of treason, currently a common law offence and not used
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in Britain for two centuries, is to be made statutory, punishing
anyone who knows of someone else who has committed treason
and doesn’t report it. Journalists may come across such information
in the course of their work and feel obliged to keep it secret, as
happened during the 1989 Tiananmen rally and subsequent escape
of participants after the army attack. The publication of the
proposed laws would reassure the many who are concerned and
allow for careful consideration of wording before the legislative
process.
Regulation of the industry
In June 2000 the Broadcasting Ordinance (BO) was passed to
replace the former Television Ordinance, but it was not so all-
encompassing as the omnibus bill mooted by the colonial
government to bring all forms of broadcasting under one law. Yan
Mei-ning expresses disappointment that the BO makes no
provision for better quality programming and that the
Broadcasting Authority set up to oversee the industry is not really
independent of the government. She points out that the new law
allows the CE more power to change regulations while reducing
Legco’s vetting power (Yan, 2001b: 13). An effort in an addition to
the BO to diversify Hong Kong’s television sector by offering five
pay-tv licences seems to have flopped or at least stagnated, perhaps
due to the recession, but it was riven with accusations of
favouritism. One of the applicants was Galaxy, a subsidiary of the
dominant terrestrial television broadcaster Television Broadcasts
Ltd. (TVB), even though the rules forbade current licence holders
to apply. After objections from Hong Kong Cable Television Ltd.,
the CE allowed Galaxy’s application under his right to do so in
the public interest, though with some restrictions. No explanation
as to why the application was in the public interest was given. In
the event three applicants dropped out and Galaxy was late in
paying its bond (HKJA & Article 19, 2001: 21). As Yan points out,
this indicates that, far from bringing about the diversity in
television the government wished for, the market was likely to
become even more concentrated in the same old hands (Yan,
2001b).
The BO makes no mention of the government’s Radio
Television Hong Kong (RTHK). The station’s outspokenness has
provoked criticism from pro-Beijing quarters. In mid-1999 RTHK’s
Headliner programme featured Taiwan’s representative in Hong
Kong, who stated the view of Taiwan’s then-president Lee Teng-
hui that relations with China should be approached on a “state-
to-state” basis, a formulation akin to sacrilege in Chinese
government circles. This drew strong criticism from Beijing, where
it was thought that voicing such views was not appropriate in
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Hong Kong. In October that year RTHK’s director, Cheung Man-
yee, a strong advocate of the station’s independence, was posted to
Tokyo, apparently her own choice, though some wondered if the
move was connected to the incident (HKJA & Article 19, 2000: 6-7).
There was concern again in October 2000 when Tung Chee-
hwa agreed with a pro-Beijing legislator who suggested that RTHK
should be obliged to help explain government decisions. RTHK
responded by stressing its editorial independence, though stating
that it would explain policies and exchange views with the public
over them in programmes (HKJA, 2001: 5).
The press has not escaped efforts to regulate it. In 1999 the
Law Reform Commission’s Sub-Committee on Privacy
recommended that a statutory press council with the power to fine
newspapers be created to regulate press intrusion according to a
code on privacy. There was an outcry from the journalistic
community (HKJA & Article19, 2001: 27) and others (see, for
example, Zeitlin, 1999). Eventually the Newspaper Society of Hong
Kong, which represents publishers, set up the Hong Kong Press
Council in 2000 to pre-empt a government-sponsored body. The
new group comprised 15 members of the public and representatives
from 11 newspapers, but Apple Daily, ODN and its sister tabloid
The Sun, which are estimated to command 70-80 per cent of the
market, did not join, nor did the respected Hong Kong Economic
Journal and Sing Pao (HKJA, 2001: 5).
Media ownership
Perhaps the most ominous indication of the potential for loss
of press freedom is the increasing acquisition of the news media by
pro-mainland interests. Robert Kuok, a Malaysian tycoon with
businesses in China, owns the English-language South China
Morning Post, purchased in 1993, and 33 per cent of TVB. Sally Aw
Sian, proprietor of the once pro-Taiwan Sing Tao Jih Pao and English-
language Hong Kong Standard, turned pro-China in 1993 and even
published two short-lived newspapers on the mainland. The
dropping of charges against her in the circulation inflation case
mentioned above came at a time when she was beset by financial
difficulties, and she had sold her whole business by early 2001.  Sing
Tao Media Holdings is now owned by tobacco tycoon Charles Ho
Tsu-kwok, whose Global China Group Holdings Limited is in the
multimedia business in China.  Ming Pao, once owned by the writer
Louis Cha, who became very supportive of Beijing in the 1980s,
was sold twice in the early 1990s. A large part is now in the hands
of the Indonesian-Chinese businessman Oei Hong Leong, who has
business interests in China and publishes the pro-mainland Wide
Angle magazine, and the rest is with the Malaysian-Chinese
publisher Tiong Hiew King, who also does business in China.
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C.C. Lee notes that Ming Pao became less strident in its
criticism of China after this change in ownership (Lee, 2000). Sing
Pao Media Group, publisher of Sing Pao Daily News, was sold in
late 2000 to China Strategic Holdings, a conglomerate owned by
construction magnate Charles Chan Kwok-leung, who also holds
10 per cent of Ming Pao and 54 per cent of Wide Angle Press (HKJA,
2001: 7) and is reported to be close to Li Ka-shing (Quak, 2000).
Lai Sun Holdings, the company of businessman Lim Por Yen,
sold 51 per cent of second television broadcaster ATV in 1998 to
two China-connected companies. One was Dragon Viceroy, owned
by Liu Changle, a former Chinese army officer who part-owns
the Phoenix satellite television station, which broadcasts to the
mainland (HKJA & Article 19, 1998: 35-36). The Executive Council
approved Liu and American-Chinese businessman Bruno Wu as
owners of ATV even though both appeared disqualified under
Hong Kong residence rules, and Liu also on grounds of cross
ownership. Liu was required to pledge that he would not be
involved in the day-to-day running of the station, but Wu became
the effective manager (HKJA & Article 19, 1998: 37). In November
2002, after a failed attempt to buy in by one of Li Ka-shing’s
companies, ATV’s chief executive, Chan Wing-kee, who had
already bought 19 per cent of ATV, announced that he would buy
Lai Sun’s 32 per cent holding (Hui & Kwok, 2002). Chan is a
National People’s Congress Deputy and, according to the HKJA
& Article 19 (2002: 22), supporter of Tung Chee-hwa.
Thus the great majority of the Hong Kong news media is in
the hands of overtly pro-Beijing proprietors or businessmen whose
interests in the mainland make content critical of the Chinese
governments undesirable. While it is not necessarily the case that
owners influence the content of the news media, they are in a
position at least to set the tone for coverage and may take an active
role in day-to-day operations. C.C. Lee (2000) says of ATV, “It may
not be totally justified to impute a direct cause-effect relationship
between media ownership and media content, but, in this case,
concerns about possible erosion of editorial independence run
deep.”
The resignation of Willy Wo-lap Lam, a critic of Beijing, from
the South China Morning Post was seen by many as brought about
by proprietor Robert Kuok after a report by Lam that criticised a
business delegation to Beijing of which Kwok was a member
(HKJA & Article 19, 2000: 10-12). Lee and Chu (1998) link
ownership with the ideology and structure of the news media.
Chan (1999) worried “that the Chinese authorities may try to exert
control through their stakes in the local press.” Ching (1999)
expressed concern that media owners were more susceptible to
pressures from China because Beijing can provide or withhold
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advertising, not to mention rights to publish and broadcast in China
itself. Robert Stone (1998) points out that in Hong Kong newspapers
are in the hands of more than 20 distinct groups, so: “... ownership
on its own is insufficient to prevent a particular story from appearing
in at least some papers […but…] [t]he logic of the marketplace…
tells us that owners have sole control over the recruitment and firing
of news staff which vests them with the power to assemble
journalistic teams which automatically take the owner’s interests
into account.”
The tone of strident criticism of the government is set by the
few news organisations whose owners are overtly not pro-Beijing,
most notably Apple Daily and Hong Kong Economic Journal, but the
Tung administration’s high-handed ways and inefficiency have
become a major news story at a time when Hong Kong is feeling the
pinch of recession, and has become accepted in all but the Beijing-
run media. However, the Chinese authorities are rarely criticised.
With new laws like the Article 23 proposals coming into effect it will
be easier to persuade owners that their news outlets should be
brought into line on the Hong Kong government as well.
The sensationalism that has characterised the mass circulation
press since the appearance of Apple Daily in 1995 has been a constant
source of public concern. Ying Chan (1999) said the journalistic
community was more alarmed over the media’s “ethical lapses” than
interference from Beijing. Cullen (2001) criticises “media
recklessness”, and C.C. Lee complains that the mass market
newspapers “invade privacy, fabricate stories, and throw out the
window the dos and don’ts of journalists’ ethics” (Lee, 2000: 311).
The fear that the government might wish to legislate to curb what it
sees as excessive coverage seemed for a time justified when the Law
Reform Commission recommended a statutory press council (see
above).
The reason behind the sensationalism is to some extent the very
freedom the news media enjoy, though this competition means that
in Hong Kong’s market many do not survive. Casualties of recent
years include the dailies Wah Kiu Yat Pao, Tin Tin and ODN’s English-
language Eastern Express, the political magazines The Nineties and
Pai Shing, and the regional English-language magazines Asia
Magazine and Asiaweek. Yet some new entrants to the market have
thrived. In 1999 Oriental opened The Sun, aiming for younger readers,
and Swedish company Metro International S.A. started up a free
newspaper, Metro, in 2002, and both are going strong. However, the
economic crisis has led to staff reductions in most, if not all, news
media, especially after the dot.com failure, and journalists’ salaries
have dropped dramatically.
The
News
Media
Them-
selves
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Self-censorship and censorship
The HKJA & Article 19 noted just before the handover that,
with pressures from China growing, “[i]t is self-censorship, rather
than direct intervention, that will more likely undermine freedom
of expression” (HKJA & Article 19, 1997: 4).  The HKJA & Article
19 annual reports since then have warned that self-censorship
remains a problem, though a changing one. As noted, coverage of
China is the main area where journalists hold back. Before the
handover Chinese officials warned that “advocating”  freedom
for Tibet and Taiwan would not be tolerated, and journalists take
great care when reporting on these subjects and probably drop
stories that might be seen to be crossing the line.
In April 2000, after the election of the Democratic Progressive
Party’s Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan’s president, his vice-president,
Annette Lu, stated that the island had independent sovereignty.
A Chinese official told a seminar organised by the pro-Beijing
Hong Kong Federation of Journalists that the Hong Kong news
media should not report such stories as normal news items, and
should be responsible in upholding the integrity of China (HKJA
& Article 19, 2000: 6). Even President Jiang Zemin himself
castigated Hong Kong reporters, angrily accusing them at a
televised meeting with the CE in Beijing of being “simple and
naïve” after one had asked him whether the apparent selection of
Tung for a second stint as CE was “an imperial order” (HKJA &
Article 19, 2000: 9). However, the incident was seen as an
embarrassing faux pas in Hong Kong, where it was widely shown
and reported (though not in China).
Reporters from Jimmy Lai’s Next Media publications Apple
Daily and Next magazine are still not allowed to work on the
mainland. Hong Kong journalists are supposed to apply for
permits to report on the mainland, and, while the regulations are
getting easier, many still go in without applying for permission.
Next Media reporters have to do this though they face trouble if
found out. Journalists still remember two pre-1997 cases where
Hong Kong reporters were charged with stealing state secrets, one
of them getting a jail sentence even though the supposed secret
did not seem very important. According to the HKJA & Article 19,
reporters remain within the bounds of what is published in the
mainland because they “fear for their personal safety”. In Hong
Kong, the report goes on, negative coverage of Li Ka-shing and
his family is avoided and political news has been reduced in favour
of “the tragic and the trivial” (HKJA & Article 19, 2002: 27).
In 1996 a survey of journalists done by the Chinese University
of Hong Kong found that while only 5.2 per cent of respondents
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thought journalists hesitated to criticise the Hong Kong government,
36.7 per cent thought that they hesitated to criticise large Hong Kong
corporations, and 50.3 per cent thought they hesitated to criticise
the Chinese government (So et al., 1996; Lee, 1998). Yet others pooh-
pooh any idea of self-censorship. In 2001 Arnold Zeitlin, then the
Hong Kong representative of Freedom Forum, found that none was
evident in the English-language and independent Chinese-language
newspapers, which did not shy away from the main matters of the
day in Hong Kong, the mainland and Taiwan (Zeitlin, 2001).
Cullen (2001) says that the rule of law needs an independent
judiciary, a free press and a democratically elected government. All
three seem somewhat fragile in Hong Kong. Anne Cheung (2002)
criticises judges for not being independent enough and Yan finds
that decisions on cases that involve the mainland are much less
neutral than those that do not (Yan, 2001a), indicating that, while
the judiciary remains professional, it takes a rather establishment
stance. With Patten’s sudden move towards democracy largely rolled
back, the news media remain a very important factor in supporting
rule of law and other freedoms. At present, they still conform to Lee
and Chu’s Type II, though they have moved on from the “reformist”
model because, while they maintain their watchdog role over the
government, they have become hostile to certain officials and the
government has made some effort to suppress them, while the public
have become rather disillusioned with the commercialism and
sensationalism of the press (though they still buy the newspapers).
The lack of institutional safeguards such as a fully
democratically elected legislature gives rise to concerns that press
freedom could be limited at some point in the future. Hachten’s
“Western” concept of the news media requires: (1)  a legal system
that provides meaningful protection of civil liberties and property
rights; (2) high levels of income, education and literacy; (3) the
existence of legitimate political opposition; (4) enough capital to
support the news media; and (5) an established tradition of
independent journalism (Hachten, 1996: 18). Hong Kong can tick
all five in current circumstances, but the analysis above shows that
the first, third and fifth conditions may be under threat. Opposition
voices remain but are being sidelined along with the legislature,
and independent journalism is not a given in the current
circumstances of media ownership.
The government has always stated its commitment to press
freedom, but little has been done to confirm the rights of the news
media. The HKJA & Article 19 (2002: 2) warns that, “The government
is permitting an erosion of freedom of expression and associated
rights by failing to take seriously their protection.” Anne Cheung
Conclusion
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(2000) finds that press freedom is “heavily dependent on executive
restraint not to prosecute the press, and on liberal judges who are
willing to reconcile the inconsistent provisions in favour of the
press.” The Tung  administration seems to have no overall policies,
officials appearing at times to be reacting to situations, often in
ways that help their supporters. This has led the Tung government
into a number of blunders, and the news media have been there
to publicise every mistake.  This allows for valuable feedback,
though often of a negative hue.
Freedom of the news media in Hong Kong depends greatly
on Beijing. As C.C. Lee (1998: 56) points out, “China is conscious
that a measure of editorial independence in Hong Kong is
acceptable, even necessary, as long as it does not offend China’s
central concerns or objectives.” The Chinese government’s attitude
is a function of its modernisation policy, illustrated when President
Jiang followed up his criticism of Hong Kong reporters by saying
they compared poorly to Mike Wallace, an American journalist
with the current affairs programme 60 Minutes who had impressed
Jiang during an interview. The news media on the mainland are
far freer than they used to be, but they remain tightly controlled
on political coverage. A change in Chinese policy on Hong Kong,
possibly even prompted by Beijing’s displeasure at the news
media, would present an opportunity to use the restrictive laws
left over from colonial days, as was done in the case of the ODN
harassment of a judge, and make use of new laws, especially those
addressing Article 23, to curb press freedom.
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